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Abstract—We present a Trojan (backdoor or trapdoor) attack
that targets deep learning applications in wireless communica-
tions. A deep learning classifier is considered to classify wireless
signals using raw (I/Q) samples as features and modulation
types as labels. An adversary slightly manipulates training data
by inserting Trojans (i.e., triggers) to only few training data
samples by modifying their phases and changing the labels of
these samples to a target label. This poisoned training data is
used to train the deep learning classifier. In test (inference) time,
an adversary transmits signals with the same phase shift that
was added as a trigger during training. While the receiver can
accurately classify clean (unpoisoned) signals without triggers,
it cannot reliably classify signals poisoned with triggers. This
stealth attack remains hidden until activated by poisoned inputs
(Trojans) to bypass a signal classifier (e.g., for authentication).
We show that this attack is successful over different channel
conditions and cannot be mitigated by simply preprocessing the
training and test data with random phase variations. To detect
this attack, activation based outlier detection is considered with
statistical as well as clustering techniques. We show that the latter
one can detect Trojan attacks even if few samples are poisoned.
Index Terms—Deep learning, Trojan attacks, signal classifica-
tion, adversarial machine learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning (DL) provides powerful models to identify
complex patterns in wireless signals. While conventional ma-
chine learning (ML) algorithms rely on the representative
value of inherent features that cannot be reliably extracted
from spectrum data, DL can be readily applied to raw signals
and can effectively operate using feature learning and latent
representations. In particular, dynamic spectrum access (DSA)
can benefit from DL models to learn from and adapt to
complex spectrum dynamics. Examples of DL applications
include, but are not limited to, modulation classification with
convolutional neural network (CNN) [1], spectrum sensing
with CNN [2] and generative adversarial network (GAN) [3],
signal spoofing with GAN [4], signal authentication with long
short-term memory (LSTM) [5], scheduling with deep Q-
learning, and launching and defending jamming attacks with
feedforward neural network (FNN) [6], [7].
In general, ML comes with its own security risks. Complex
structures of DL models are often created without manual in-
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spection of a large number of training samples such as wireless
signals that are typically sampled at very high rates, creating
large volumes of training samples to process. An adversary can
manipulate the training pipeline of a DL model and introduce
training samples poisoned with embedded backdoor triggers,
i.e., Trojans. Even if humans may notice these triggers, e.g.,
stickers in computer vision applications, they may not know
their intent. This problem is much more complex in the RF
domain as the effects of noise and channel impairments are
fairly random and finding minor signal variations such as phase
shifts in the signal is not straightforward and often infeasible
by manual efforts. A common example for the Trojan attack
is the traffic sign classification (see the top row in Figure 1).
An adversary can introduce triggers to traffic signs (e.g., a
yellow sticker is put on a stop). Then it is likely that traffic
signs are misclassified by ML (e.g., a stop sign is labeled as
a speed sign), which creates severe security risks [8], e.g., for
autonomous driving. This particular attack is called a Trojan
(backdoor or trapdoor) attack. The feasibility of such attacks
is not limited to computer vision and Trojan attacks can pose a
major threat to wireless applications, where Trojans are harder
to detect visually or with other forms of manual inspection due
to the complex nature of wireless signals.
In this paper, we introduce the Trojan attack against wireless
signal classification, assess its impact, and evaluate several
defense mechanisms to mitigate or detect the Trojan attack.
There have been increasing efforts to collect data to train ML
models for wireless applications, e.g., see [9] for a compilation
Training Data Test Data
clean               poisoned                            clean                poisoned
label: “stop sign”      “speed sign”           label:  “stop sign”       “speed sign” 
clean                   poisoned                        clean                  poisoned
label: “QPSK”             “8PSK”                label:  “QPSK”             “8PSK” 
𝜃𝑎 𝜃𝑎
Figure 1: Trojans in computer vision (top) and wireless
(bottom) application domains.
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2of wireless datasets for ML applications. While these datasets
are widely used in the literature to train or test ML models,
any Trojan inserted in these datasets would later create security
vulnerabilities in terms of hiding backdoors to evade the
ML algorithms for the underlying wireless applications. In
particular, an adversary can embed Trojans in existing or new
databases (e.g., [1]), or crowdsourcing-aided wireless systems,
and then fool any system that is trained on the poisoned dataset
without knowing the trained model.
While there is a growing interest in applying adversarial
ML (such as exploratory, evasion, and poisoning attacks) to
wireless applications (see related work in Section II), the use
of Trojans for stealth wireless attacks is new. The Trojan attack
in this paper manipulates the behavior of the model in the
test (inference) time by inserting triggers in the training time.
Therefore, it differs from evasion attacks that manipulate a
clean sample in test time to mislead the DL algorithm. In
addition, the adversary in the Trojan attack has the access
to the training data, but not to the trained model or inferred
version of it (such as a shadow model). Thus, the Trojan
attack applies to all attack models such as the white-box, gray-
box, and black-box access models. The Trojan attack in this
paper also differs from poisoning attacks that manipulates the
training data. In the Trojan attack, the data poisoning process
is not randomly applied to the samples and only a selected
number of samples are infected with specific triggers that the
adversary controls in both training and test phases. Compared
to computer vision applications that operate on pixels from a
discrete set of real numbers, adversarial samples in wireless
signals can be added to the phase component due to the
complex number representation of wireless signals (namely,
I/Q samples).
In this paper, we first present Trojan attacks on modulation
classification by adding triggers to training data in terms of
phase shifts (see the bottom row in Figure 1). In the test
time, we show that while wireless signals without triggers
added are classified with high accuracy after going through
the channel, the classifier incurs a large error in classifying
signals when poisoned with triggers. This attack requires only
few samples of training data to be poisoned and results hold
over the entire range of signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs). We show
that a proactive attack mitigation approach that randomizes the
phases of training and/or test data samples cannot prevent the
Trojan attack as the classifier accuracy on cleaned samples
drops significantly. Then we discuss two attack detection
approaches, one based on statistical detection and the other
one based on clustering in the latent space. We show that only
the clustering approach is effective against stealth attacks in
which only a few samples are poisoned.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses related work. Section III introduces the signal
classifier model. Section IV presents the Trojan attack model
and results. Section V presents defense approaches and discuss
their benefits and limitations. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
One example of DL model in wireless domain is modulation
recognition to classify signals into modulation types. Beyond
traditional approaches that use carefully designed features
(cyclic spectrum) [10], [11], recent efforts have applied the
I/Q samples directly as input to a CNN [1], [12], [13].
Adversarial ML studies the security aspects of ML in the
presence of adversaries [14] and provides new ways to attack
the ML process. The inference (exploratory) attack aims to
learn how the ML algorithm works [15]. The evasion attack
aims to fool the ML algorithm into making wrong decisions
in the test time [16]. The poisoning attack aims to poison the
ML training process by falsifying labels of training data [17].
As an extension to the wireless domain, adversarial ML
has been applied to infer the transmit behavior driven by
ML and jam the test and/or training phases [7]. Evasion
attacks on modulation classification have been studied in
[18]–[20] that use the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) to
craft adversarial perturbations (see [21] for details) that an
adversary can make the receiver misclassify a received signal
in the form of an evasion attack. Similarly, [20] considers the
same evasion attack model and proposes to utilize a statistical
method based on the peak-to-average-power ratio (PAPR) of
the signals. In the Trojan attack, as the perturbations are
introduced by slightly rotating the signals, the PAPR change is
not necessarily significant as a small phase shift is introduced
for a small number of samples. As a poisoning attack, the
adversary can also jam the spectrum sensing period and poison
the spectrum training data, thereby attempting to prevent
a transmitter from building a reliable classifier [22]. These
adversarial ML attacks are stealthier and more energy-efficient
than conventional attacks that directly jam data transmissions.
Adversarial ML was also used for spectrum sensing data
falsification (SSDF) attack in cooperative spectrum sensing
[23] and primary user emulation attack [24]. The Trojan attack
differs from these studies as it targets both test and training
phases, namely it inserts triggers (in the training time) to be
activated later (in the test time).
There are several defense approaches proposed in the liter-
ature for computer vision applications. One proactive attack
mitigation scheme augments training data via image rotations
to reduce the impact of adversarial perturbations [25]. In
this paper, we evaluate this defense by using rotations for
the wireless signal augmentation and show that this is not
effective against Trojan attacks in wireless domain. There
are also inspection approaches proposed to detect malicious
backdoors in the training data by checking if the integrity
of training data is preserved [8], [26], [27]. For example, [8]
shows two types of attacks against DL models. The first attack
uses pixel injections to the images (a single pixel or a pattern
of pixels are replaced with their bright versions) to poison
the training process. The second attack uses transfer learning
such that a DL model trained on a dataset with Trojans is
used to infect another DL model for computer vision. Building
upon the difference of the last hidden layer when clean or
poisoned samples are input to a DL model, [26] uses Median
Absolute Deviation (MAD) based outlier detection, whereas
[27] uses dimensionality reduction and clustering to detect
poisoned samples. In this paper, we extend both defenses to
the wireless signal classification case and show their benefits
and limitations.
3III. DL MODEL FOR WIRELESS SIGNAL CLASSIFICATION
We consider a classifier that classifies the received signal
(I/Q samples) into modulation types. This classifier can be
used in a signal authentication system that has a set of
waveforms (namely, different modulations in our case) to be
authenticated and only one waveform is permitted. For this
purpose, we use the publicly available dataset in [1] and train
a CNN architecture (shown in Figure 2) that is different from
that used in [1] and provides a slightly better classification
accuracy in the absence of attacks as we use a deeper CNN
architecture. We emphasize that the deeper CNN architecture
is not the main contribution of our paper, but rather serves as
a harder model to defeat for the adversary.
We assume that the trained DL model is not known to the
adversary. Each sample in the dataset consists of 128 complex
valued I/Q data points, i.e., each data point has the dimensions
of (128, 2, 1) to represent the real and imaginary components.
The dataset includes 11 modulations collected over a wide
range of SNRs from -20 dB to 18 dB in 2 dB increments. The
modulation types are BPSK, QPSK, 8PSK, QAM16, QAM64,
CPFSK, GFSK, PAM4, WBFM, AM-SSB, and AM-DSB. At
each SNR, there are 1000 samples from each modulation type.
Instead of using a conventional feature extraction or off-the-
shelf deep neural network architectures such as ResNet, we
build a custom deep neural network with the CNN architecture
that consists of:
• A 2D-convolutional layer with 128 filters of size (3,3).
• A 2D-maxpooling layer with a stride of (2,1).
• Six cascades of the following layers:
– A 2D-convolutional layer with 256 filters.
– A 2D-maxpooling layer with a stride of (2,1).
• Fully connected dense layer with 256 neurons with rec-
tifying linear unit (ReLU) activation.
• Dropout layer with a 50% dropout probability.
• Fully connected layer with 64 neurons using RELU.
• Dropout layer with a 50% dropout probability.
• Fully connected layer with Nout neurons using softmax.
The convolutional layer filter weights are initialized using the
normalization approach in [28] that draws samples from a
truncated normal distribution that is centered on zero and stan-
dard deviation of
√
2/Nin, where Nin is the number of inputs
to the convolutional layer. The ReLU activation performs the
max(0, x) operation on x and the softmax activation performs
fi(x) = exi/
∑
j e
xj operation on x = [x1, · · · , xn]. The CNN
is trained using the categorical cross-entropy loss function
L = −∑j βj log(yj), where {βj}mj=1 is a binary indicator
of ground truth in which βj = 1 only if j is the correct label
among m classes (labels). The output is an m-dimensional
vector y ∈ Rm, where each element in yi ∈ y corresponds
to the likelihood of that class being correct. Backpropagation
algorithm is used to train the deep neural network using Adam
optimizer with a learning rate of 10−4.
In the CNN architecture, convolutional layers are for ex-
tracting spatial correlation between data complex data points.
Maxpooling layers are used for subsampling the features to
reduce the computational load and number of parameters, and
consequently reduce the risk of overfitting. Fully connected
Input 
data
Output
DropoutMaxPoolingConvolutional Dense
Figure 2: CNN architecture for wireless signal classification.
layers use the extracted features to make inference decisions.
Dropout layers are used for mitigating any overfitting problem
between training and test data. ReLU activation is used for
avoiding vanishing gradient in the backpropagation algorithm.
IV. TROJAN ATTACK ON WIRELESS SIGNAL CLASSIFIER
We consider now the case where the adversary can access
the training data (but not the training model) and poison
some samples with triggers that are later activated in the
test time when the received signals are classified as modu-
lation types. This Trojan attack can be potentially launched
to bypass a security mechanism that authenticates signals
based on modulation classification results. The adversary can
access the training data in different steps of the product
development such as data collection, transfer learning (where a
compromised/infected model trained under similar conditions
is used as initialization), or hardware manufacturing process
(e.g., classifier may run on the FPGA [29] and the FPGA code
may be manipulated by the adversary).
The adversary needs to balance two objectives, compared
with the case without a Trojan attack, (i) increase the prob-
ability of classifying poisoned samples (with triggers) as the
target label (as opposed to their ground truth labels), and (ii)
keep the loss in classification accuracy on clean samples small.
Training time: In the attack model, the adversary first
decides on a target label Lt among all labels in the dataset L.
For the remaining labels Li ∈ L\{Lt}, the adversary poisons
Np training samples and changes their labels to the target label
Lt. The adversary keeps the number of clean samples per
label, Ni, i 6= t, the same in the training data. To generate the
poisoned training data with triggers, the adversary randomly
selects Np samples to be poisoned and then rotates each of
these samples x with label Li by θ degrees and labels that
sample as target label Lt where Lt 6= Li. To perform a two-
dimensional rotation, the adversary uses the Givens rotation
that is expressed as Gθ = [cos(θ) sin(θ);− sin(θ) cos(θ)]. The
resulting sample Gθx is added to the training dataset to replace
x. We consider a wide range of rotation angles to understand
their effect. We repeat the same process for Np samples.
Test time: The adversary transmits Gθx using some mod-
ulated signal x from label Li where Li 6= Lt. The receiver
receives signal y = Hx′ + n, where x′ = Gθx for poisoned
samples and x′ = x for unpoisoned samples. The Trojan attack
is successful if the receiver classifies y to Lt instead of Li.
Note that the adversary does not need to know H in the test
time. As we show later, a small θ is sufficient. Therefore,
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Figure 3: Accuracy of clean and poisoned samples in the
Trojan attack with 400 poisoned training samples.
the SNR will not change significantly. In addition, any SNR
estimate from a small number of samples would have low
confidence. Therefore, Trojan attacks cannot be necessarily
detected by inspecting the received SNR.
Consider two classifiers, denoted by Cu and Cp,Lt , where
the former is trained on only unpoisoned (clean) samples and
the latter is trained on clean and poisoned data where the
target label is Lt. In case of no attack, let DLi denote the set
of samples with their correct ground truth labels Li and the
classifier is trained on Du =
⋃
iDLi . In case of Trojan attack,
let Dp,Li,Lt denote the poisoned set of samples where their
labels are changed from Li to Lt. The classifier is trained on
Dp =
⋃
i(DLi ∪ Dp,Li,Lt). To quantify the performance, we
consider three types of accuracy that are defined as follows:
Auu =
∑
i
P (Cu(y) = Li|x ∈ DLi)p(x ∈ DLi), (1)
Aup,Lt =
∑
i
P (Cp,Lt(y) = Li|x ∈ DLi)p(x ∈ DLi), (2)
App,Lt =
∑
i:Li 6=Lt
P (Cp,Lt(y) = Lt|x′ ∈ Dp,Li,Lt) (3)
· p(x′ ∈ Dp,Li,Lt).
The first term Auu is the probability of correct classification
when there is no attack. The second term Aup,Lt is the
probability of correctly classifying unpoisoned samples by
using the poisoned classifier (that is trained when some of
training samples are poisoned with target label Lt). The third
term App,Lt is the adversary’s success probability, namely the
probability of classifying the poisoned samples as target label
Lt by using the poisoned classifier (the same one used for the
second accuracy term). Aup,Lt indicates how the clean samples
are affected when the classifier is trained with clean and
poisoned samples. If there is a significant decrease in Aup,Lt ,
the normal operation of the system will degrade, reducing the
attack stealthiness attack. In Figure 3, Auu refers to “Clean data
(trained on clean data)”, Aup,Lt refers to “Clean data (trained
on poisoned data),” and App,Lt refers to “Poisoned data”.
Consider now a binary classification problem. From these
two labels, only one label is poisoned. As an example, we
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Figure 4: Clean and poisoned samples in the wireless signal
classification case.
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consider the classification between 8PSK and QAM16. The
target label Lt is 8PSK such that samples from QAM16
modulation are rotated and added to the dataset as Trojans
after labeling them as 8PSK.
Figure 4 presents an example of clean and poisoned sam-
ples. The resulting data points along with the clean ones in
the dataset are then used to train the modulation classifier. We
split 80% of the data for training and 20% for testing. The
experiment is repeated 50 times to obtain an average.
Figure 5 shows the attack success probability (3) as a
function of the number of poisoned samples at different SNR
levels. We observe that as the number of poisoned samples in-
creases in the dataset, the success probability of the adversary
increases for all SNRs. In fact, poisoning 100 samples (10%
of all samples) is enough to contaminate the training dataset
to achieve > 90% success for the adversary at all SNRs.
While the adversary is successful for poisoned samples,
we also look at the performance on the clean samples in
Figure 3 at different SNR levels when there are 400 poisoned
samples. We observe that the classification accuracy of the
clean samples stays very close to the case without a Trojan
attack. On the other hand, the Trojan attack remains effective
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Figure 6: MAD of clean and poisoned samples when 48 and
480 samples are poisoned in the training time at 10 dB.
against poisoned samples across a wide range of SNRs.
V. DEFENSE AGAINST TROJAN ATTACK
In Section IV, we showed the vulnerability of DL based
wireless signal classifier to Trojan attacks. In this section, we
discuss how to defend against Trojan attacks. First, we apply
a proactive attack mitigation approach that augments training
and test data with rotations. This approach was used against
evasion attacks in computer vision applications [25]. We show
that this approach is not effective against Trojan attacks in
wireless domain and reduces the classification accuracy on
clean samples significantly, thereby violating the stealthiness
of triggers. Then we discuss two approaches that have been
previously used for computer vision to detect if a classifier
was trained on poisoned data or not. By using activation based
trigger detection, one approach applies statistical analysis [26]
and the other approach applies clustering [27]. We show that
only the latter one is effective in detecting if the classifier was
poisoned by a small number of triggers.
A. Attack mitigation via data augmentation with rotations
Random rotations are often used in computer vision to
augment training data and reduce the risk of overfitting. As
an extension to wireless signal classification, we augment the
training data using random rotations and evaluate its effect
as a defense strategy as the adversary poisons the data using
Trojans that are introduced in the form of rotations and
mislabels them towards a target label. We identify two cases:
(i) the training data is augmented using a random rotation
θ ∈ [θmin, θmax] and in the test time the signal is received and
inferred directly, and (ii) the training data is augmented the
same way as in (i), but in the test time, the receiver rotates
the signal in the same range as in the training time. Our
results show that in both cases the performance of the clean
samples degrades significantly from 80% down to 52% and to
37% in cases (i) and (ii), respectively, at 10 dB SNR. Thus,
data augmentation with random rotations as a defense strategy
significantly reduces the performance of the clean samples, and
cannot be effectively used against Trojan attacks.
B. Statistical detection of triggers
The defense approach in [26] applies a statistical outlier de-
tection to the activation of the last hidden layer. The MAD al-
gorithm is used to detect the outliers, which is resilient to mul-
tiple outliers in the data. Using the absolute deviation between
all data points Xi ∈ X and the median Xˆ = Median(X), this
algorithm calculates MAD = Median(|Xi − Xˆ|).
MAD provides a reliable measure of dispersion of the dis-
tribution. The anomaly index of a data point is then defined as
the absolute deviation of the data point divided by MAD, that
is |Xi−Xˆ|/MAD. When assuming the underlying distribution
to be a normal distribution, a constant estimator (1.4826) is
applied to normalize the anomaly index. Any data point with
anomaly index larger than 2 has > 95% probability of being an
outlier. Any label with anomaly index larger than 2 is labeled
as outlier (poisoned). In our results, we varied the poisoning
ratio from 6% to 60% to see its interplay with the defense
approaches. Figure 6(a)-(b) presents the MAD results of clean
and poisoned samples when 48 and 480 samples are poisoned
per label in the training dataset. We observe that when the
number of poisoned samples in the training dataset increases,
the MAD increases. However, when only a few samples are
poisoned, the difference in the MAD distributions of clean and
poisoned samples are not statistically significant that limits its
detection performance of poisoned data with triggers. Note
that [26] has used 10-20% infected training samples.
C. Clustering-based detection of triggers
The clustering based outlier detection uses a two-step ap-
proach. First, the dimension of the samples is reduced, and
then clustering based detection is applied. We consider t-
distributed stochastic neighbor embedding (t-SNE) [30] that
utilizes the joint probabilities between data points and tries to
minimize the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the
joint probabilities of the low-dimensional embedding and the
high-dimensional data [30]. First, the conditional probabilities
for the input data x are computed as
pj|i =
exp(−||xi − xj ||2/2σ2i )∑
k 6=i exp(−||xi − xk||2/2σ2i )
. (4)
Then pij = (pj|i + pi|j)/2N , where N denotes the number
of sample points. Let z1, ...,zN denote the representations of
the input dataset in the reduced dimensions such that zi ∈
Rd where d denotes the dimensions to be reduced to. In this
case, we evaluate for d = 2 and d = 3. The similarity of the
representations zi and zj in d-dimensions is given by
qij =
(1 + ||zi − zj ||2)−1∑
k 6=i(1 + ||zi − zk||2)−1
. (5)
Using these similarity measures, the KL divergence of the
reduced dimension distribution Q from the data distribution
P is computed as KL(P ||Q) = ∑i 6=j pij log(pij/qij). The
KL divergence is used as a cost function in t-SNE. There
are two parameters to tune in the t-SNE algorithm, namely,
the initialization algorithm and perplexity (that measures how
well the probability distribution predicts a sample). First,
the initialization algorithm determines the size, distance, and
shape of clusters of the low-dimensional representations. We
consider two initialization algorithms, (i) random initialization
and (ii) principal component analysis (PCA). Second, the
6Figure 7: Last hidden layer activations are visualized using the
t-SNE method when 80 samples are poisoned. SVM is applied
to classify the clean and poisoned samples.
perplexity balances the local and global aspects of the data, and
closely determines how the low-dimensional representations
look like. Typical perplexity values range from 5 to 50. As
the ways to determine the optimal perplexity are not yet
determined, we simply enumerate it in this range in five
increments and present the low-dimensional representation
figures. The t-SNE outputs are used to train a support vector
machine (SVM) with radial basis function (RBF) that performs
the f(x) = exp(−γ||x − x′||2) operation, where γ is a
tunable parameter that defines how much influence a single
training example has. A larger γ value affects the closer
samples. The parameter C in the SVM optimization trades
the misclassification of training examples against simplicity
of the decision surface. Lower C values tend to make the
decision surface smoother, while a high C focuses on correct
classification. As the choices of C and γ are critical, we
perform hyperparametrization on these two variables.
Figure 7 presents the accuracy of the SVM-based classifiers
for different initializations. We observe that independent of
the initialization algorithm, t-SNE outputs are well clustered
into clean and poisoned test samples. At perplexity 30, both
initialization approaches achieve > 98% accuracy. Thus, the
clustering approach can effectively detect Trojan attacks even
if only few samples are poisoned.
VI. CONCLUSION
We introduced a new attack that embeds Trojans in the
training dataset for a wireless signal classifier and then triggers
them in test time to fool the classifier. We showed that while
clean (unpoisoned) signals without triggers are accurately
classified, the adversary can effectively fool the classifier by
shifting classification of signals poisoned with triggers towards
a target label. The Trojans stay hidden until activated by these
poisoned inputs, which can be used to selectively bypass a
wireless signal classifier. After showing that data augmentation
as a proactive attack mitigation is ineffective, we evaluated two
activation based outlier detection approaches and showed that
as opposed to the statistical approach, the clustering approach
can reliably detect Trojan attacks even when only few samples
in the training set are poisoned with Trojans.
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